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Abstract
This article presents an original dataset of direct public funding (DPF) of political parties across 27 post-communist
regimes from the outset of transition until 2020. It represents the first systematic, and detailed account of the actual
level of DPF provided to parties outside established democracies in terms of geographical and temporal coverage. The
dataset has a panel format and includes information on DPF per registered voter and cast ballot separately and in aggregate
for more than 800 country-year observations and more than 200 election campaigns. The analysis unveils substantial
cross-national and within-country variation in the level of DPF, as well as between statutory and election financing.
Despite an increasing reliance of political parties on the state, no pattern exists regarding the dynamics of access and
distribution rules. It also highlights the limitations and risks entailed by the extensive use of various proxies such as
dichotomous indicators, composite regulatory indexes, or perception-based measures that do not capture cross-national
and within-country variation either in DPF or other dimensions of political financing regime.
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Introduction
This research is driven by conceptual, operationalization
and empirical challenges regarding how state funding of
political parties is tackled in cross-national research. While
each challenge is analytically distinct, they are closely
intertwined and affect each other’s dynamics. They are
particularly visible in the advancement of theory-driven
research still hindered by the insufficient development of
‘comprehensive theoretical frameworks, [ . . . ] sharp con-
ceptual tools and classificatory schema’ (Norris and van Es,
2016: 2).
Despite recent progress in assessing the impact of party
and campaign funding on the quality of democracy, party
competition, membership rates, party-business relations, and
political corruption through theoretical lenses (Cagé, 2020;
Casal Bértoa et al., 2014; Fazekas and Cingolani, 2017;
Hummel et al., 2019; McMenamin, 2013; Potter and Tavits,
2015; Rashkova and Su, 2020; van Biezen and Kopecký,
2017), two fundamental challenges remain. The first con-
cerns the deficit of accurate cross-national longitudinal data,
while the second touches on the data conversion into con-
ceptually reliable and valid measurements (Norris and van
Es, 2016: 2). Whereas data gaps started to be filled through
individual and collective efforts (Cagé, 2020; Poguntke
et al., 2016; Scarrow et al., 2017), the geographical coverage
is mainly limited to Western democracies. Consequently,
most large-N studies rely on various proxy measures epito-
mized by aggregate regulation-based indexes or dichoto-
mous indicators, which, at best, only scratch the tip of the
party finance iceberg.
Against this backdrop, this study contributes to the
research on comparative party finance by partially addres-
sing some of the existing limitations and challenges stem-
ming from the data shortage and its operationalization into
reliable measures suited for cross-national and longitudinal
analysis. It introduces a new dataset on direct public fund-
ing (DPF) of political parties across 27 post-communist
regimes from the outset of transition to nowadays (1990–
2020). The dataset contains information on the actual level
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of state funding provided for party statutory and election
activities for more than 800 country-year observations and
almost 230 elections. Furthermore, it contains additional
relevant indicators for the design of the DPF mechanism,
such as the eligibility (pay-out threshold) and allocation
rules. Accordingly, regardless of whether DPF is treated
as an outcome or as an explanatory variable, this data will
help party scholars and practitioners to assess better the
effects of state resources on party competition or other
phenomena of interest.
Party finance in comparative research:
State of the art and limitations
During the last two decades, there has been an increase in
scholarly attention to the effects of political financing
regime (PFR) on different aspects of party competition,
political corruption, and democratic quality. This progress
is particularly noticeable in diversifying methodological
approaches employed by scholars dealing with political
finance research. While case-oriented studies remain the
workhorse of party funding literature, an emerging body
of comparative analyses apply variable-oriented or mixed
research designs. Table 1 provides an overview of studies
and data resources in political finance since Susan Scar-
row’s review (2007: 196) to show the differences and the
progress in the field. While in her overview country studies
dominate the landscape, Table 1 presents a more heteroge-
neous picture.
Besides a shift towards a more sophisticated research
agenda and a more diversified palette of methodological
tools, the critical difference between earlier and more
recent studies is the ability of the latter to overcome the
isolation from the mainstream research of party politics,
electoral competition, party-business relations, and dem-
ocratic governance. Despite increased access to empirical
data and the acknowledgement of party and campaign
financing as a critical factor affecting party system devel-
opment, electoral competition, and democratic govern-
ance, a paradox remains. With some exceptions mostly
limited to established democracies (Cagé, 2020; Casas-
Zamora, 2005; McMenamin, 2013; Nassmacher, 2009;
van Biezen and Kopecký, 2014), hard empirical data on
political funding are primarily used in case-oriented
research or small-N studies, while large-N studies rely
almost exclusively on various proxy measures instead of
the actual figures.
This approach is confirmed by the prevalence of studies
using regulation-based measures that rely on the IDEA
political finance database (Austin and Tjernström, 2003;
Falguera et al., 2014) or follow a similar operationalization
technique. They employ dichotomous indicators (absence
vs availability of public funding, absence vs presence of
donation caps) or composite indexes constructed through
different aggregation techniques. Hence regardless of
whether one employs DPF as a self-standing indicator or
incorporates it into a composite index, it reflects only the
regulatory scope (quantity of regulations) with little to no
bearing on the regulatory depth (the content of regulations).
Consequently, the regulation-based measures employed to
assess the effects of PFR/DPF on party competition and
political corruption are sensitive to the way how they are
constructed. Therefore, it is not surprising to discover that
empirical studies testing similar hypotheses produce oppo-
site results.
A case in point is epitomized by the mixed results
obtained from the testing of the cartel party thesis (Katz
and Mair, 1995, 2009). While parties increasingly relied on
the state, the collusion of established parties has not frozen
party competition and has not hindered the emergence of
newcomers (Casas-Zamora, 2005: 40–43; Hino, 2012;
Hug, 2001: 102; Pierre et al., 2000: 20; Scarrow, 2006),
although some scholars found that a broader regulatory
scope and higher regulatory density is more likely to deter
new party entry (van Biezen and Rashkova, 2014). Like-
wise, the provision of DPF was found to be positively
associated with lower electoral volatility, higher party sys-
tem institutionalization, a higher survival rate of small par-
ties, and a more level playing field (Birnir, 2005; Booth and
Robbins, 2010; Casal Bértoa and Spirova, 2017; Potter and
Tavits, 2015; Rashkova and Su, 2020). Finally, despite
contrasting developments, the rules on ballot access, elig-
ibility threshold, free broadcasting and subsidies have gen-
erally shifted from more restrictive to more inclusive over
time, albeit the increase in DPF still favoured the estab-
lished parties (Bowler et al., 2003; Loomes, 2012; Piccio
and Biezen, 2018).
Another example concerns research investigating the
relationship between PFR (including the provision of DPF)
and party corruption. There are several measures employed
to test whether a harsher PFR or the availability of DPF
deter corruption: a binary measure (absence vs presence of
DPF), a composite index of direct and indirect funding, an
aggregate index of PFR including DPF, and the share of
DPF in the structure of party income. While a few studies
found the provision of DPF to be negatively associated with
corruption (Ben-Bassat and Dahan, 2015; Hummel et al.,
2019; Kostadinova, 2012: 83), others came to the opposite
conclusion (Abel van Es, 2016: 2018; Casal Bértoa et al.,
2014: 366; Casas-Zamora, 2005: 39; Evertsson, 2013;
Fazekas and Cingolani, 2017; Lopez et al., 2017: 27–28;
Nassmacher, 2009: 143), or could not find consistent evi-
dence in either direction (Norris, 2017: 228–229; van Bie-
zen, 2010: 70; van Biezen and Kopecký, 2007).
None of them, however, accounts for the variation in
DPF. Yet precisely this kind of variation accounts for the
regulatory depth of financing rules. For instance, the DPF
level might significantly influence the fundraising beha-
viour of political parties and electoral competitors. If public
funding covers a large part of the parties’ financial needs, it
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might weaken the incentives to source funds illicitly, espe-
cially when subsidies are withdrawn as punishment for
such behaviour. Otherwise, the probability of deterring
political actors’ involvement in such murky deals remains
feeble. Hence, where political corruption is party related,
what matters is not just to provide symbolic budgetary
Table 1. Selected multi-country studies and data resources on political financing.
References Period Country/region coverage
Data type and methodological
approach
Studies on political funding
Smilov and Toplak
(2007)
1990–2006 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary,





1990–2007 Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic,
Moldova, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania
Case oriented, longitudinal
Nassmacher (2009) Various, range from 1950 to
2007
Israel, Mexico, Austria, Italy, Japan, Sweden,
Poland, Spain, Germany, France, Ireland,
Canada, USA, Switzerland, Denmark, Australia,
Britain, Netherlands
Variable-oriented, longitudinal
Koß (2010) 1968–2008 Germany, Sweden, Britain, France Case oriented, longitudinal
Butler (2010) Various but focus on post-
1990
Mexico, Malaysia, Botswana, Russia, Brasil, South
Africa,
Case oriented, longitudinal
Mendilow (2012) Various but focused on
1990–2011
France, USA, Spain, Philippines, Zimbabwe,
Bangladesh
Mostly case-oriented
McMenamin (2013) Separate for each country,
range 1984–2005
Australia, Canada, Germany Variable-oriented at country
level, case-oriented across
countries
Norris and Abel van
Es (2016)
Separate for each country but
focus on the post-1990
period
Brazil, Britain, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia,
South Africa, Sweden





Party level data, range 2002–
2016
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, France, Germany,
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands,






Various, contemporary It varies depending on the author, chapter and
subject, including western established
democracies and CEE countries
Mixed, case, and variable-
oriented, longitudinal
Power (2020) Separate for each country,
range1991–2017
Britain, Denmark Case oriented, longitudinal
Cagé (2020) Range1868–2018 for various
countries but focused on
1980–2017
France, USA, Britain, Italy, Germany, Spain,
Belgium, Canada
Mixed, case, and variable-
oriented, longitudinal
Datasets dedicated to political funding or including variables on party and campaign financing
van Biezen (2013) Range 1944–2012 33 countries Legal texts including party and
party finance laws
Falguera et al. (2014) The 2012 edition of the
Political Finance Database
(updated in 2018 and
2020)





2014 54 countries Expert-based assessment of
regulatory scope across




Election level data, range
2012–2018





Party level data, range 2002–
2016
25 countries, 146 political parties Variable-oriented, longitudinal
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support but to provide sufficient funds to weaken the incen-
tives to seek resources from unlawful sources.
While the discussion of how much DPF political parties
should receive from the state to deter them from seeking
illicit funds remains open, the use of regulation-based
indexes does not capture this variation. The deficit of hard
cross-national time-series data is reflected by the emer-
gence of an alternative approach. It relies on expert assess-
ment in constructing perception-based indexes on the scope
of formal rules and more specific issues such as the sig-
nificance of DPF in the pool of campaign resources, fair-
ness and transparency in accessing public and private
funding, equitable access to media, or the impact of vested
interests on the electoral outcomes. The resulting measures
are used to assess more broadly the quality and integrity of
the electoral process (Coppedge, 2020; Coppedge et al.,
2020; Global Integrity, 2014; Norris and Abel van Es,
2016b; Norris and Grömping, 2019b). While their use is
still limited, the key challenge they face is identical to
regulation-based indexes – whether they are valid proxies
for actual party financing.
The last aspect often referred to as hindering the
advancement of party funding research concerns the omis-
sion of temporality (Grzymala-Busse, 2011; Pierson,
2004). This omission is a common feature of large-N stud-
ies analysing the effect of PFR/DPF on party competition
and corruption (Abel van Es, 2016; Ben-Bassat and Dahan,
2015; Birnir, 2005; Booth and Robbins, 2010; Casal Bértoa
et al., 2014; Potter and Tavits, 2015; Rashkova and Su,
2020; Tavits, 2008). Certainly, temporality is explicitly or
implicitly accounted for as an element of the research
design to mitigate the risk of reverse causation between the
explained and explanatory variables through their measure-
ment at different points in time. However, it is not present
as a methodological tool to account for the diachronic var-
iance similar to the cross-case synchronic variance in the
variables of interest (Bartolini, 1993: 135). While tempor-
ality is more carefully integrated into case study research
(Butler, 2010; Casal Bértoa and Biezen, 2018; Mendilow,
2012; Mendilow and Phélippeau, 2018; Norris and Abel
van Es, 2016a; Roper and Ikstens, 2008; Smilov and
Toplak, 2007), the problem of generalizability and external
validity remains a critical issue. Heretofore, only a few
studies have incorporated temporality to analyse the rela-
tionship between PFR and political corruption, but in all
cases, the explanatory variable was operationalized either
as a composite index of PFR (Fazekas and Cingolani, 2017;
Lopez et al., 2017) or an aggregate DPF index (Hummel
et al., 2019).
As this overview shows, reliance on aggregate indexes
bundling together indicators measuring different aspects of
PFR (e.g., donation and spending limits, provision of DPF)
through various techniques is not the optimal way to inves-
tigate the effects of PFR on party competition or corrup-
tion. More importantly, similar scores might conceal
substantial differences between apparently identical cases,
which can be misleading for troubleshooting the most pro-
blematic areas of PFR from a policy perspective. Against
this background, I present a dataset containing more fine-
grained indicators capturing the cross-national and tem-
poral variation in DPF.
The general overview of the dataset
The dataset of the DPF level covers 27 post-communist
regimes during 1990–2020.1 The data structure accounts for
cross-national and within-country variation as well as fund-
ing levels for party statutory and election financing. Accord-
ingly, for the statutory party funding, the unit of analysis is
country-year, while for the campaign financing – country-
elections. Most of the data come from official primary
sources. In a few cases, when primary sources were not
available, the level of DPF was estimated based on rele-
vant regulations and economic indicators. Since the data-
set and Supplemental materials (Appendix B) provide
details on operationalization and sources for each country,
here it suffices to mention that in most cases, I rely on
budget laws and their implementation, decisions of the
electoral management bodies and oversight institutions,
as well as party and campaign funding laws and
regulations.
Additionally, I use a wide range of electoral monitoring
and technical assistance reports of various international
organizations (Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), Group of States against Corrup-
tion (GRECO), International Foundation for Electoral Sys-
tems (IFES), International Republican Institute (IRI),
National Democratic Institute (NDI), etc.), and other sec-
ondary sources. Furthermore, when there are data incon-
sistencies even between official sources, I cross-check
them with alternative data. While some discrepancies
might remain, they do not affect critically data accuracy
and reliability.
Based on the raw DPF data, I construct two indicators
suited for cross-national and longitudinal analysis: direct
public funding per registered voter (DPFRV) and direct
public funding per vote (DPFV). The first is calculated
by dividing the total DPF by the official number of regis-
tered voters, while the second is obtained by replacing
registered voters with cast ballots. These indicators are
available for three levels of analysis: statutory, election and
total funding. While their value is expressed in current
USD, thus, without accounting for the purchasing power
parity or inflation, anybody interested in constructing alter-
native measures and proxies incorporating them can use
raw data expressed in local currency. Furthermore, based
on raw data and Nassmachers (2009: 109–115) formula
used to estimate the index of political spending, one may
calculate an equivalent index of DPF that automatically
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accounts for the cross-national variation in economic
development, purchasing parity and inflation.
Besides the level of DPF, I also collected information on
other variables of the DPF mechanism, such as the eligibil-
ity (pay-out threshold) and allocation rules. The former
pertains to the legal requirements to get access to DPF,
while the second – the distribution of DPF among those
who are eligible. In the following sections, I conduct a
descriptive analysis of the dataset from different angles that
uncover the variation in DPF: the method whereby DPF is
determined, the relationship between DPF for statutory and
election funding, and the cross-national and within-country
variation over time. Next, I explore the same developments
regarding access and distribution rules. Finally, I provide a
short validation test of the relationship between the actual
DPF and several alternative measures.
Method determining the level of DPF
Assuming that incumbents are expected to determine the
level of state funding to their advantage, the way it is deter-
mined might affect patterns of interparty competition. If
political parties know in advance the criteria of how DPF
is determined, this awareness creates a more predictable
and transparent environment for political competition. On
the contrary, if the rules are ambiguous, they create more
space for abuse. Casas-Zamora (2008) uses party discretion
to set the subsidy level as a defining feature of the DPF
regime. The lack of clearly defined and predictable rules on
setting the level of DPF is more prone to political manip-
ulation. It might contribute to a faster increase in subsidies
than vice-versa (Casas-Zamora, 2008: 14–15). By applying
this framework to the post-communist regimes, I investi-
gate whether this relationship holds. While post-communist
polities have used various methods to determine the DPF
level, they fall within three categories:
a. Party or electoral law explicitly stipulates a fixed
amount of DPF and how it is distributed based on
electoral performance expressed in cast ballots or
parliamentary seats.
b. Party or electoral law determines the level of DPF
based on a flexible economic indicator such as the
average or minimal wage, a given share of budget-
ary revenues, expenses, or GDP.
c. The level of DPF is determined annually based on
an ad-hoc decision, usually adopted through the
budgetary process.
In terms of transparency and predictability, the first
method is better since the law details how many subsidies
parties will receive. However, it requires bargaining over
the new terms each time the key actors decide to alter the
level of funding. Nevertheless, in those countries that used
this method to determine the amount of DPF (e.g.,
Armenia, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Latvia, Poland,
Russia, and Slovakia), the key players could strike the nec-
essary agreements to increase the DPF level. While the
frequency of such agreements varies, the increase in DPF
suggests that when it comes to securing higher access to
state resources, political parties can overcome existing dis-
agreements to accommodate each other’s interests.
The second method relies on an economic indicator used
to determine the DPF level, such as a wage-based coeffi-
cient or a percent of budgetary revenue, expenses, and
GDP. Besides transparency and predictability, flexibility
represents a clear advantage over the previous one since
it cushions the effects of inflation. It is also the most pop-
ular method employed by the post-communist regimes –
however, contingent on the precise indicator, the mechan-
ism slightly varied. Where DPF was determined based on a
wage-based coefficient (Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Moldova,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Slovakia), the calculation
procedure followed a bottom-up approach. It was linked
to the registered voter, cast ballot, parliamentary seat, or
their combination.
Conversely, when a specified percentage of the state
budget or GDP was used as a benchmark to determine the
subsidy level (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia,
Lithuania), the mechanism followed a top-down approach.
The total amount of funding was determined firstly at an
aggregate level and then distributed among beneficiaries.
Nevertheless, despite the built-in advantage of self-
adjusting, it has not prevented political parties from push-
ing for more budgetary resources, from switching from one
method to another or looking for new DPF sources such as
local budgets. These amendments suggest that the party
appetite for resources grew faster than wage levels or the
budgetary revenue.
Finally, according to the last method, the size of DPF is
determined by an ad-hoc decision, usually adopted through
the budgetary process. For campaign funding, it may also
represent a decision of the electoral or another body
adopted separately for each contest. Theoretically, this is
the most discretionary and flexible method to accommo-
date party needs on a short-term basis. Because it creates
the largest leeway for parties to bend the rules to their
advantage, it is more likely to be manipulated to extract
resources from the state. Albania, Azerbaijan, Estonia, and
Hungary used it for the entire period, while Lithuania,
Bulgaria, Macedonia, Slovenia experimented with it for
shorter periods. Likewise, Croatia, Russia, Uzbekistan, and
Tajikistan used it to determine the funding level for elec-
tions. Nevertheless, as one will see, there is substantial
variation in the funding level between cases within this
group.
Figure 1 provides a comparative overview of the DPF
level by funding type (statutory vs elections), indicator
(DPFRV vs DPFV) and the method used to determine it.
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Contrary to Casas-Zamora’s assumption, there is no clear
pattern between the method and amount. While in most
cases, the preferred method to determine the level of DPF
represents a dynamic indicator, as the boxplot’s width
shows, the ad-hoc decision is not associated with the
extraction of more state resources. One possible explana-
tion for this outcome is the incremental nature of the bud-
getary process that would curb even the parties’ ability to
exploit their privileged position relative to other actors
subject to budgetary allocation rules and constraints.
Regardless of the method used, political parties amended
the regulatory framework as they saw fit to readjust the
level of state resources to match their financial needs.
Statutory vs election financing
There are three policy options regarding the provision of
DPF to political parties. DPF can be earmarked for day-to-
day party operations, electioneering activities, or both.
While these alternatives are acknowledged, this distinction
is rarely accounted for in comparative research. The choice
of a given policy option, however, might have considerable
implications for party system development and party com-
petition. While the most inclusive option for party devel-
opment is to offer enough funding for statutory and election
activities, it is not always the case. Of course, if statutory
funding can be used for elections, this is not a problem.
However, from the perspective of electoral competition,
this distinction is crucial because the access and distribu-
tion criteria might be different. Hence, if statutory funding
is available only to established parties that fulfil the elig-
ibility criteria, the access to the election subsides is more
relevant since it affects considerably the calculations of
political entrepreneurs to enter the competition given the
entry costs. Whereas the availability of DPF for campaign-
ing is one among many factors affecting electoral compe-
tition, it proved to affect party system institutionalization,
electoral volatility, and the ability of new parties to succeed
(Birnir, 2005; Booth and Robbins, 2010; Hino, 2012; Hug,
2001; Ibenskas, 2020; Potter and Tavits, 2015; Rashkova
and Su, 2020; Tavits, 2008).
On the other hand, if DPF is provided only for elections,
it is not a sustainable policy option for long-term party
development since it is a one-shot game. The peculiarity
of campaign subsidies is confirmed by their differential
impact on the electoral success of anti-establishment,
radical-right and fringe parties across established and
young democracies. While across Western democracies,
the degree of state funding of elections was found to boost
the electoral support for the radical-right parties (Bichay,
2020), the opposite holds for the new East-European
democracies. Easier access to DPF earmarked for cam-
paigning proved to diminish the support for the anti-
establishment parties across post-communist polities
(Bértoa and Rama, 2021).2 Despite these divergent find-
ings, the long-term effect of electoral subsidies on party
longevity appears to be limited. Although election subsi-
dies may help new parties to break through, without access
to DPF for day-to-day party operations, the probability of
party survival is lower (Casal Bértoa and Spirova, 2017).
While all three policy options are present across post-
communist polities, there is a substantial variation regard-
ing the countries’ preferences towards a given policy
alternative and the DPF level. This variation is noticeable
in Figure 2 that displays the relationship between statutory
and election funding using DPFRV and DPFV during elec-
tion years. Although most cases lie within the range of
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for election activities
Figure 1. Variation in the DPF level across post-communist regimes by method and funding type 1990–2020.
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is still high even within this range, let alone outside it. Data
also shows that despite the absence of a clear pattern: Mon-
tenegro, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Croatia stand
out for the overall generosity. Likewise, Estonia, Bulgaria,
Bosnia and Herzegovina can be singled out given the lar-
gesse of DPF provided for statutory party activity. At the
other extreme, one finds more than half of former-soviet
republics that provided little to no support to electoral com-
petitors. The rest, including Hungary, Slovenia, Serbia,
Poland, and Lithuania, lie between the two extremes.
Variation over time in the level of public
funding
While the previous two sections can be regarded as two
snapshots of the same phenomenon taken from different
angles, this section introduces the dynamic element. It
looks at both cross-national and within-country variation
over time for DPFRV and DPFV. Unlike previous sections,
where data was split based on the DPF type, here I present it
in aggregate. Hence, for the election years, the DPF incor-
porates statutory and election funding, while for the non-
election years – only DPF for party daily operations. Even
though DPFRV and DPFV are highly correlated, the DPFV
is more relevant because it is closer to what parties actually
receive from the public purse. Since often the funding level
was linked neither to the electoral market size nor the elec-
toral turnout, the difference between the registered voters
and cast ballots considerably affects both measures. In
short, the lower the electoral turnout, the higher the gap
between the DPFRV and DPFV. The relationship between
these two indicators is illustrated in Figure 3.
The figure displays tremendous cross-national and
within-country variation in the amount of DPF over time.
One-third of post-communist polities located at the top of
Figure 3 are visibly ahead of others regarding the level of
state support, although the variation is considerable even
within this group. For instance, if one takes the total DPFV
provided over the years, top-ranked Montenegro provided
twice as much as Slovakia and the Czech Republic and
almost three times more than Slovenia. These disparities
are even more remarkable if one steps outside the group of
heavy DPF providers. Poland and Russia, which are
middle-ranked, still provided more DPF by a factor of five
to six than Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan.
Partially, this variation is also driven by the timing of the
DPF introduction, which splits post-communist polities
into two groups. While most CEE and Balkan countries
introduced DPF either immediately after the fall of com-
munism or during the early stage of transition, almost all
former-Soviet republics followed suit much later. Some of
them, including Kazakhstan, Moldova, Latvia, Ukraine,
and Azerbaijan, introduced DPF only after two decades
of independence or later. While few ex-soviet republics
subsidized campaigning, the level of state support was so
insignificant that it covered only a tiny share of the financial
needs of parties and candidates. Furthermore, in a few
authoritarian regimes (Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan),
state funding was the only legal source of income for
campaigning.
The differences in DPF are even more prominent if one
considers cross-national and within-country variation
simultaneously via two aspects of temporality – direction
and magnitude of change. Overall, one may identify two
broad developments. The first represents a steady increase
in DPF followed by its stabilization with fluctuations in
both directions. The second depicts an increase followed
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Figure 2. Relationship between the level of DPF for party statutory and election financing. Note: Data is jittered on both axes to
minimize overlapping at low levels of DPF.
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regarding the magnitude of change conceived in relative
and absolute terms. The relative magnitude reflects the
increase or decrease in DPF per time unit, while the abso-
lute magnitude reflects the ratio between the highest and
the lowest value of DPF.
A few examples will illustrate these points. In the Czech
Republic, the Law on Political Parties (LPP) was amended
three times between 1990 and 2000. As a result, the nom-
inal value of DPFV for campaign reimbursement increased
tenfold, from CZK 10 to CZK 15, 90 and 100, respectively.
Likewise, following the Velvet Revolution in 1993, Slova-
kia increased the amount of DPFV for election expenses
fourfold, from SKK 15 to 60 in 1994. While the level of
DPF remained unaltered for roughly a decade, the
Belarus Tajikistan
Azerbaijan Ukraine Moldova Armenia
Romania Albania Latvia Uzbekistan
Russia Georgia Macedonia Poland
Slovenia Lithuania Serbia Kazakhstan
Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary Bulgaria
Montenegro Estonia Croatia Bosnia & Herzegovina
1990 2000 2010 2020 1990 2000 2010 2020























































































































Figure 3. Variation over time in the level of DPF by country and type 1990–2020. Note: The y-axis is adjusted to each country’s range in
the DPF level due to high cross-national variation.
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intensified political competition at the turn of the millen-
nium put more pressure on party finances. Hence, follow-
ing the replacement of the allocation mechanism from a
fixed coefficient to a flexible indicator in 2004 (1% of the
average monthly wage per vote), by the 2006 parliamentary
contest, the reimbursement of election expenses increased
by almost three times.
Similar developments occurred in Georgia and Russia,
although they touched on statutory party funding. Between
2005 and 2013, the Georgian LPP was amended three times
(2007, 2009 and 2013) by expanding the mechanism of
DPF. Consequently, the nominal value of DPF in 2019 was
almost five times higher than in 2005. Russia is an even
more striking case since it switched from a dynamic indi-
cator (minimum wage) to a fixed coefficient in less than 2
years from the effective introduction of DPF in 2004.
Because the minimum wage growth was much slower than
party demand for resources, the funding level increased
tenfold already in 2005. Furthermore, between 2004 and
2017, the LPP was amended five times, resulting in a nom-
inal increase of DPF by a factor of 300.
Even in countries where the funding level was linked to
a floating coefficient, such as a percent of budget revenue
that would ensure a constant increase in financing, political
parties could not refrain from tinkering with the rules.
Montenegro is an extreme case in point, especially given
the generosity of the state. The share of state funds
increased from 0.2% in 1993 to 0.5% in 2017, with supple-
mentary fluctuations (0.3–0.6%) in between. Moreover,
since the central budget funds were insufficient, the local
budgets became an additional source of income in 2008,
with shares ranging from 0.5% to 3%. Accordingly,
between 1994 and 2020, the subsidy level increased by
24 times (dollars equivalent). Likewise, the increasing
demand for resources pushed Macedonian parties to switch
from an ad-hoc decision method to a budget share-based
formula in 2004 (0.06% of the budget revenue). In 2018,
the share of budgetary funds earmarked for parties was
augmented to 0.15%, resulting in a ninefold increase in
DPF (dollars equivalent) between 2005 and 2019.
Despite an upward dynamic in most countries, the
noticeable cases are those in which the decline in DPF
represents a deliberate decision of the very actors affected
by it. The decrease in public funding occurred through
amending the LPP, earmarking less than the maximum
ceiling set by law, or budgeting less than previously.
Regardless of the exact mechanism at work, there are
instances in which the decline in DPF represents the out-
come of deliberate party decisions. Poland, Estonia, and
Bulgaria are exemplary cases in this respect. In Poland,
the amendment of the LPP in 2010 resulted in a substantial
drop in the subsidy level. In 2011, Polish parties received
for their statutory operations about half of DPF earmarked
in 2010. The same holds for their Bulgarian counterparts.
Following a twelvefold increase of financing during
2001–2009 (BGN1–BGN12 per vote), state funding
dropped to BGN11 and BGN8 in 2014 and 2020, respec-
tively, which constitutes a decline of one-third. Finally,
Estonian parties, which decided on the funding level via
the budget law, passed through a similar experience.
Accordingly, following an eighteenfold surge in DPF
(dollar equivalent) between 1996 and 2008, it dropped
by 30% by 2019.
These examples illustrate the inability of composite reg-
ulatory indexes or binary indicators to capture the differ-
ences in the funding level. I turn now to the other two
aspects of the DPF mechanism – eligibility and allocation
rules. While eligibility rules are employed as a substitute
for a dichotomous indicator of DPF (Birnir, 2005; Bértoa
and Rama, 2021; Casal Bértoa and Spirova, 2017), alloca-
tion rules received almost no consideration from the aca-
demic community. The lack of attention is somewhat
surprising, considering their prominent role in the policy-
makers’ struggles over the distributional consequences of
DPF for party competition.
Eligibility rules to public funding
Eligibility rules, as embodied in the pay-out threshold to
obtain access to DPF, represent a crucial benchmark for the
inclusiveness of the DPF mechanism. They play a central
role in the argumentation line of the cartel party thesis that
assumes the propensity of the established parties to protect
themselves against the competition from the newcomers by
raising the entry barriers (Katz and Mair, 1995, 2009). To
obtain state funding, political parties must fulfil a minimum
requirement expressed in votes, seats, or both. For election
financing, there is another criterion employed to allocate
funding – official candidate status. Candidate status as an
eligibility benchmark has several implications for the
inclusiveness of the DPF scheme and electoral competi-
tion. It removes the barriers (past electoral performance)
to DPF, expands the pool of recipients, and creates incen-
tives for the formation of new parties by covering a part of
the entry costs.
Moreover, if statutory funding is always disbursed based
on past electoral performance, this does not always apply to
elections. Campaign subventions may be disbursed before
and after elections or through both methods, either as
advance payments for campaigning or reimbursement of
election expenses. However, when candidate status serves
as a benchmark alone or combined with other access cri-
teria, the subsidy associated with it is always disbursed in
advance; therefore, it can be used for electioneering.
Hence, a lower access threshold to DPF is associated with
the openness towards competition and favours the emer-
gence of new parties.
The left-hand panel of Figure 4, which reflects the
dynamics of the eligibility rules for party statutory fund-
ing, exhibits three developments: stability, increase and
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decrease in the pay-out threshold. The range in the elig-
ibility requirements to public funding varies from 0 in
Moldova to 7% in Kazakhstan.4 It also shows that stabi-
lity is the dominant pattern in most countries. The
remaining countries are split into roughly two equal
groups that either increased or decreased the barriers to
access state funding. While Albania, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Romania shifted towards more
demanding conditions, Georgia, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Slovenia, and Lithuania switched to friendlier access rules.
The right-hand panel of Figure 4 shows that, relative to
statutory funding, the access to election subsidies repre-
sents a more inclusive process since approximately half
of the post-communist regimes deemed candidate status a
sufficient condition to benefit from the state support. A
possible explanation for this inclusiveness is the minimal
support offered by the state in such cases. Thus the access
to DPF is likely to have little impact on the electoral out-
comes, although a stronger symbolical effect. The
dynamics of the pay-out threshold to campaign subsidies
reveal similar diverging trends as for the access to statutory
funding. While the status-quo prevails (several former-
Soviet republics, Poland, and Hungary), other cases are
divided into those increasing (Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia,
Serbia, and Slovakia) and decreasing (Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia) the bar-
riers to DPF. This mottled picture shows that the regulation
of access to DPF substantially varies across post-
communist polities, thus offering inconclusive evidence
to support the cartelization of party politics, at least regard-
ing the access conditions.
Allocation rules of public funding
The distribution formula reflects the method whereby state
funding is apportioned among recipient parties. Two con-
flicting principles are built into any distribution formula,
i.e. equality and proportionality (van Biezen, 2003: 44–45;
OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission, 2010: §§ 183–
185, 2020: §§ 237–239).5 Equality, in its extreme form,
implies that DPF is evenly apportioned to political parties
or electoral competitors, regardless of their electoral per-
formance. In contrast, proportionality foresees a distribu-
tion exclusively based on electoral performance measured
in votes, parliamentary seats, or both. Normatively speak-
ing, a mechanism combining both principles by applying
‘objective, fair and reasonable criteria’ in distributing sub-
sidies ‘might be most effective at achieving political plur-
alism and equal opportunity’ (Council of Europe, 2003: §
1; OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission, 2020: § 239).
However, when defining such criteria, the precise meaning
of ‘objective, fair and reasonable’ becomes quite proble-
matic (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2006). Accordingly, incorporat-
ing these conflicting principles into any distribution
formula will yield a biased allocation contingent on the
recipients’ identity.
Despite this normative tension, I assess the distribution
method based on its openness towards party competition. It
ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 implies a pure egalitarian
and 1 – a fully-proportional distribution of funding. For
instance, if half of DPF is evenly distributed among all
eligible parties (without accounting for past performance),





































































































































































































Figure 4. Cross-national and within-country variation in access rules to DPF for party statutory and election financing 1990–2020.
Note: The X-axis from the right-hand panel represents the sequence of parliamentary elections.
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electoral performance, I assign a score of 0.5. The closer/
farther this score lies to/from 1, the more/less concentrated
the distribution of subsidies is among beneficiaries. The
result of this operationalization is presented in Figure 5.
Pure proportionality represents the dominant allocation
method, with fewer cases incorporating the egalitarian ele-
ment. One may notice three distinct trends concerning the
change in allocation rules: stability, towards a more egali-
tarian and a more proportional distribution. As Figure 5
reveals, the status-quo prevails in about two-thirds of coun-
tries for both types of funding.6 Remarkably, the former
Yugoslav republics, Albania, and Romania are the cases
recording the most frequent changes in the allocation
mechanism for statutory funding (Panel A), although in
different directions. While Albania, Slovenia, and Serbia
shifted towards a more egalitarian distribution, Croatia,
Montenegro, and Romania switched to a more concentrated
allotment of subsidies. Montenegro and Albania also record
the most frequent amendments in the allocation of electoral
subventions (Panel B), albeit in opposite directions. Even
though this indicator does not reveal the underlying criteria
employed to apportion state subsidies (votes, seats, party
membership, electoral competitor status),7 the presence of
quite pronounced egalitarian elements undermines the
logic of a purely instrumental approach in designing the
rules that would favour exclusively the established parties.
Comparison with alternative measures
The observed variation in the funding level reveals a critical
limitation of a binary coding used to assess the effects of
DPF on any phenomena of interest since it flattens cross-
national differences and within-country variation over time.
Likewise, reliance on aggregate regulatory indexes, which
bundle together either various aspects of the DPF mechan-
ism (amount, access, distribution) or different dimensions of
PFR (DPF, donations, spending), generate similar problems
for they measure conceptually different things. Finally,
expert-based indexes entail similar risks. While such indexes
might be internally consistent and capture better within-
country developments, they are more likely to perform
worse in assessing cross-national variation. Hence, I provide
several illustrations proving the advantages of DPFV over
alternative measures. Given the shortage of studies and data
with the same geographical and temporal coverage, I rely on
those that either intersect with my dataset or include alter-
native DPF measures besides regulatory or expert-based
indicators, such as the degree of state dependence, operatio-
nalized as the share of DPF in the structure of party income
(Casal Bértoa et al., 2014; van Biezen and Kopecký, 2014).
The exploration of binary or composite measures of
DPF does not require additional undertakings, as Figures 2
and 3 uncovered their shortcomings. Therefore, I analyse
two expert-based indexes and the degree of state depen-
dency to assess their fit against the actual DPF and party
access to funding. To test the validity of a perception-based
index against the level of DPF, I use a variable from the
‘Varieties of Democracies’ that measures the expert per-
ceptions regarding the significance of electoral subsidies
for political parties (Coppedge, 2020; Coppedge et al.,
2020: 61), which is the closest equivalent to the actual level





































































































































































































Figure 5. Cross-national and within-country variation in allocation rules to DPF for party statutory and election financing 1990–2020.
Note: The X-axis from the right-hand panel represents the sequence of parliamentary elections.
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perceptions regarding equitable access to DPF, I use the
relevant variable from the ‘Electoral Integrity Project’
(Norris and Grömping, 2019b),9 and cross it with the
pay-out threshold for campaign subsidies from my data.
The pay-out threshold represents the legal equivalent of
equitable access as defined by Norris and Grömping
(2019a: 14) and has a similar interpretation – the easier the
access to DPF (the lower the pay-out threshold), the more
equitable the access mechanism. The crossing of expert
evaluations with the DPFV, as presented in Figure 6,
reflects quite a mismatch between the expert assessments
and the objective indicators. As the left-hand panel shows,
this mismatch is particularly noticeable at low levels of
DPFV, where the expert scores on the significance of DPF
are quite widespread along the y-axis. Likewise, there is
plenty of evidence for the opposite combination – similar
expert scores coexist with significant differences in DPFV.
A similar discrepancy is noticeable in the right-hand panel.
It shows that in some cases, the absence or the presence of a
minimal legal pay-out threshold, meaning a more inclusive
and equitable access mechanism to election subsidies, is
regarded by experts as unfair or that similar expert scores
are assigned to cases with very different access thresholds.
This evidence suggests that expert-based indexes are poor
substitutes for the actual level of PDF (Panel A). Further-
more, the bias in evaluating the fairness in access require-
ments to electoral subventions, given the existence of quite
objective legal requirements, is even more worrisome for the
reliability of such measurements (Panel B), at least regarding
party and campaign funding. Considering the inconsistency
between the expert scores and the objective indicators pre-
sented here, their mechanical use in comparative research is
of substantial concern. For instance, it would be intriguing to
see whether Bichay’s (2020) findings regarding the beneficial
impact of election subsidies on the electoral performance of
radical-right parties would hold if alternative measures, such
as the actual level of DPF or another regulation-based index,
were employed instead of the expert-based index from the
Varieties of Democracies used by Bichay.
Finally, I test the degree of state dependency against the
actual level of DPF. Unlike previous measures, however,
this is a proxy derived from hard data. Hence, it is of higher
quality and better suited to comparative research. Despite
these advantages, there are two potential issues regarding its
validity and accuracy in capturing the variation in the actual
level of funding relative to DPFRV. First, the proportion of
DPF in the structure of party income might be endogenous to
the DPFRV, that is, be dependent or determined by it. While
this is not a problem, to be interchangeable with the DPFRV,
there must be a very high correlation between the two mea-
sures. Second, the degree of state dependency might still
conceal substantial differences in DPFRV even if the share
of state subsidies in the structure of party income could be
similar across different cases. To assess their interplay,
though, one needs data on private and public funding. How-
ever, given the lack of reliable data on private party funding
for the post-communist regimes, I rely on other studies,
including both measures (Casas-Zamora, 2005: 49; Nassma-
cher, 2009: 143; van Biezen and Kopecký, 2017: 87, 90).
Accordingly, if the assumption that the level of DPF
affects the state dependence rate is plausible, one would
expect a strong positive relationship between DPFRV and
the share of DPF in the structure of party income. Conver-
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B: Expert scores vs. legal access threshold
Figure 6. Relationship between the expert scores reflecting significance and access to DPF vs DPFV and the legal pay-out threshold.
Note: Data in Panel A is jittered on both axes to minimize overlapping.
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different levels of DPFRV, this would undermine their
interchangeability. The interplay between DPFRV and
state dependence, presented in Figure 7, reveals a mixed
picture. While there is a positive relationship between the
DPFRV and the share of subsidies in the structure of party
income, it is not strong enough to use them interchange-
ably. The limited potential for exchange is particularly
noticeable in the left-hand panel, displaying the raw data
with a correlation of only 0.4 and a model that explains
little variance. Hence, this makes state dependence a trou-
blesome replacement for the DPFRV. Even after a log
transformation of DPFRV that substantially improves the
strength of the relationship (r ¼ 0.67), as shown in the
right-hand panel, it is not sufficiently strong to make state
dependence a valid substitute of DPFRV. Furthermore, the
presence of similar cases on state dependence but different
on DPFRV raises additional concerns for the unwarranted
use of the former in comparative research on party finance.
Conclusion
Excessive reliance on various proxy measures typified by
single indicators such as absence vs the availability of DPF,
composite indexes bundling together several regulatory
dimensions of PFR, or expert evaluations represents a risky
endeavour for comparative research on party finance.
Besides the fact that such proxies only capture the regula-
tory scope, some are biased and inaccurate in reflecting the
lay of the land regarding the level and access to DPF. More
importantly, none of them accounts for the variation in the
level of state support provided to parties.
This study presented an original dataset of the actual
level of DPF for 27 post-communist regimes between
1990 and 2020 to address some of these limitations and
shortcomings. It provides much more reliable and accurate
measures of DPF relative to any existing alternatives that
fail to account for the level of state assistance to political
parties. Likewise, the panel structure of the dataset allows
investigating the effects of DPF on the relevant political
processes and phenomena over time, thus overcoming the
limitations of cross-sectional data.
This dataset shows a very diverse landscape regarding
the key features of the DPF mechanism. First, there is no
clear pattern between the method whereby the level of DPF
is determined and its increase over time. Irrespective of the
method, the funding level was augmented whenever the
dominant party/coalition considered it appropriate or could
reach an agreement over the new arrangements. Second,
post-communist polities greatly varied in terms of party
activities funded from the public purse. While in some
cases, political parties benefited from the budgetary sup-
port for their statutory and election activities, in other
cases, the state limited its assistance only to one of them.
Third, the data compellingly illustrate a tremendous cross-
national and within-country variation concerning the pace
and magnitude of change in the funding level.
Additionally, although the gap between the most and the
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Figure 7. Relationship between the level of DPF per voter and the share of DPF in the structure of party income. Note: Temporal
coverage: van Biezen and Kopecky (2017) – 2011–2013, Nassmacher (2009) – 2002, Casas-Zamora (2005) – 1975–1989. Currency
expressing DPF per voter, van Biezen and Kopecky (2017) – Euro, Nassmacher (2009) – USD, Casas-Zamora (2005) – 1990 constant
USD.
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the deliberate party decisions to scale down the reliance on
DPF in some cases suggest the presence of self-containing
mechanisms, irrespective of the rationales behind them.
Fourth, the variation in eligibility and allocation rules
depicts, alike, contrasting developments. While in most
cases, the status-quo represents the dominant pattern, the
shift towards more restrictive or more permissive rules vis-
à-vis the access and distribution criteria splits post-
communist regimes into two almost equal groups.
Despite an increasing reliance on the state over time by
political parties, data provides only partial support for the
cartelization thesis since empirical evidence holds exclu-
sively about the level of DPF. If one considers, however,
the shifts in eligibility and distribution rules, the carteliza-
tion argument is not fully backed by evidence. Approxi-
mately half of those post-communist regimes that amended
these conditions raised the access barriers and made the
distribution of subsidies more concentrated. Another half,
on the contrary, moved in the opposite direction by switch-
ing to a more inclusive and egalitarian mechanism in the
allocation of subsidies, thus favouring new and small par-
ties. These contrasting developments also show the limits
of the international organizations (e.g., OSCE/ODIHR)
capacity to push for the adoption of access and distribution
rules to promote a level playing field and political plural-
ism. Such inconsistent drifts hint at the prevalence of
domestic forces and intra-party system dynamics in shap-
ing the parameters of the DPF mechanism.
The validation test of crossing the DPFV with alterna-
tive indicators has convincingly shown the drawbacks of
the latter. While these shortcomings are more evident con-
cerning dichotomous indicators and aggregate regulation-
based indexes, the expert-based measures turned out to
possess critical flaws alike. The bias is particularly striking
with respect to the fairness of access requirements to state
funding, given the severe mismatch between the expert
scores and the legal pay-out threshold. As expected, the
share of DPF in the structure of party income is the next
best indicator, but it too might be skewed in either direc-
tion. Crucially, the failure of various proxies to account for
the variation in DPF or other features of PFR is of para-
mount importance in terms of policy implications for the
content and the direction of political finance reforms. Since
many studies contain implicit or explicit policy recommen-
dations, they might provide misleading insights consider-
ing the bias, imprecision, and the feeble connection of the
proxies they rely upon with the reality on the ground.
This dataset can be deployed to answer two types of
research questions contingent on the DPF status as a vari-
able. If the DPF is tackled as an explanatory variable, it
may be employed to assess the impact of DPF on variables
usually associated with the dynamics of political competi-
tion and party-voters linkages such as party system
institutionalization, permeability towards newcomers,
electoral volatility, electoral turnout, membership rates,
or confidence in political parties. Conversely, if DPF is
treated as a dependent variable, it may be used to investi-
gate the possible causes behind the variation in the level of
DPF or access and distribution rules such as the level of
economic development, regime type, electoral system
design, patterns of party competition and political corrup-
tion, among others. Therefore, it might help researchers to
cast a new light on the complex and sensitive relationship
between state funding of political parties and a wide range
of political processes and phenomena based on more accu-
rate and reliable indicators.
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Notes
1. I exclude Turkmenistan from the dataset since until 2012 there
was no political opposition allowed and no multiparty elec-
tions held.
2. The differences between Bichay (2020) and Bértoa and Rama
(2021) regarding the effect of DPF on radical parties may be
due not only to the differences between West and East but also
to the different operationalization of DPF. While Bichay relies
on the expert scores from the Varieties of Democracies, Bértoa
and Rama resort to the pay-out threshold.
3. Note, however, that because these evolutions are expressed in
USD, the fluctuations in DPF are sensitive to the exchange rate
volatility. Therefore, sometimes it might be more difficult to
identify whether they are due to the exchange rate volatility or
deliberate political decisions.
4. The lack of barriers to obtain public funding in Moldova
implies that all parties that participated in elections will
receive DPF proportionally to their electoral performance.
5. The guidelines on party regulations jointly elaborated by the
OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission apply the concept of
‘absolute equality’ – rather than ‘strict equality’ and ‘equita-
ble’ – to denote a proportional distribution based on the elec-
toral strength of a party.
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6. The precise formula employed to distribute budgetary subven-
tions may be subject to change but incorporating the same
principle. For instance, the ratio between votes and seats in
allocating public funding can change but the proportionality
principle remains unaltered.
7. Given limited space, I do not present here the variation in these
criteria, but the dataset contains such a variable for statutory
and election financing.
8. Expert feedback to the Varieties of Democracies question: Is
significant public financing available for parties’ and/or can-
didates’ campaigns for national ofice? ranges from 0 to 4 on an
ordinal scale, where 0 indicates the absence of DPF while 4
indicates a significant share of DPF in campaign budget for
most parties. Individual expert scores are then aggregated and
converted to interval scale using a Bayesian item response
theory measurement model (Coppedge et al., 2020: 61). .
9. Expert feedback to the Electoral Integrity Project question:
Parties/candidates had equitable access to public political sub-
sidies? ranges from 1 to 5 on an ordinal scale, where 1 indi-
cates a strong disagreement while 5 indicates a strong
agreement. Individual expert scores are then aggregated and
converted to interval scale representing a country-election
level score (Norris and Grömping, 2019a: 14).
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